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ABSTRACT 
The paper addresses a number of shortcomings of public choice analysis and 
develops a supplementary public choice theory involving elements of 
institutional economics and expressive motivations. The theory is then 
applied to each of the institutions involved in the process of policy 
formulation and is briefly developed in relation to the role of each in the 
development of policy in relation to the Treaty of Waitangi between 1984 
and 1990. 
The text of the paper comprises approximately 14 500 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
A The Treaty of Waitangi 
The development of public policy in relation to the Treaty of Waitangi 
in the period between 1984 and 1990 has had a considerable impact on 
New Zealand society. Viewed purely in fiscal terms, the increased 
status of the Treaty has conferred substantial benefits on a number of 
Maori groups while imposing costs on individuals and the country as a 
whole. 
Such partiality of policy is not, of course, unusual; it is an inevitable 
element of any process of redistribution. Treaty of Waitangi policy 
may, however, be seen to differ in two significant respects. Firstly, the 
Maori beneficiaries possessed little economic or political authority.1 
Further, the redistribution occurred at a time when allocation of 
government resources to interest groups was being largely removed.2 
Secondly and partly because of this context, it is difficult to identify 
plausible motives for the adoption of such policies.3 
However, although Treaty policy may be particularly obscure in this 
respect, it is clear that the motivations of much government policy 
may be difficult to determine, both because of the complexity of many 
policy decisions and because of the significance of appearances in 
democratic government and the consequent incentives for pretence.4 
B Public Choice Theory 
Public choice theory provides some solution to these difficulties and 
thus may be seen to offer at least the possibility of deductive and 
objective analysis of the process leading to the formulation of a 
particular policy.s Such analyses can serve a number of purposes 
1 A Fleras "The Politics of Maori Lobbying: The Case of the New Zealand Maori 
Council" (1986) 38 Pol Sci 27, 32. 
2 DJ Smyth & A E Woodfield "Inflation, Unemployment and Macroeconomic Policy in 
New Zealand: A Public Choice Analysis" (1993) 75 Public Choice 119, 122. 
3 R Walker Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou: Struggle Without End (Penguin, Auckland, 
1990) 266. 
4 J L Mashaw "The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law" (1989) 
65 Chi-Kent LR 123, 131; B S Frey & R Eichenberger "Anomalies in Political Economy" 
(1990) 68 Public Choice 71, 76. 
5 DC Mueller "The Next Twenty-Five Years of Public Choice" (1993) 77 Public Choice 
146, 150. 
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beyond that of providing an explanation for th~ policy in question. On 
a positive level, it is possible to extrapolate from the analysis a partial 
model of the policy formulation process and further to advance 
general propositions as to the role of different public decision-makers 
in the policy process. Normatively the analysis may, through its 
description of the allocation of authority between different decision-
makers, provide a basis for determining whether policy decisions 
reflect the preferences of those involved and more broadly allow an 
assessment of the efficacy of governmental structures in ensuring such 
propriety.6 
Application of public choice theory involves the presumption that the 
motivations of individuals making "public choices" do not differ from 
those ascribed by microeconomic theory to "private", or market-
oriented, choices. 7 The presumption may be seen to have two 
elements: first, that individuals are motivated to maximise their 
economic self-interest, and secondly, that such motivation is 
constrained rather than altered by any decision-making process. The 
effect of these elements is to allow the modelling of decision-making 
by constrasting the decisions made within the constraints imposed by 
such processes with those reached by wholly self-interested decision-
makers. 
Both elements of the presumption are open to considerable criticism. 
Firstly, the adoption of self-interest as at least the dominant, if not the 
sole, motivating factor in the public decisions of individuals is highly 
questionable on psychological and ethical grounds at least.8 Secondly, 
the view that public decision-making processes merely channel rather 
than alter individual preferences appears sociologically doubtful. 9 
Finally, even accepting both assertions it would appear necessary to 
recognise the extent to which the institutional structures of public 
decision-making influence self-interest.10 
6 J Buchanan "The Constitutionof Economic Policy" (1987) 77 Am Econ Rev 243,243. 
7 DC Mueller "Public Choice: A Survey" (1976) J Econ Lit 395, 395. 
8 G Brennan & J Buchanan "Voter Choice" (1984) 28 Am Behav Sci 185, 200. 
9 CR Sunstein "Public Choice, Endogenous Preferences" (1992) 12 Int Rev L & Econ 289, 
290. 
lO P Dunleavy Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice; Economic Explanations in 
Political Science (Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1991) 4. 
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C Supplementing Public Choice 
In response it is possible that although the public choice model is 
prone to inaccuracy or artificiality, as is the microeconomic model 
itself, such inaccuracy might be resolved or at least restrained in 
several ways.11 The first of these is shared with microeconomic theory: 
any inaccuracy in the modelling of individual decisions may be 
regarded as insignificant as the model seeks to describe the process as a 
whole. 12 The deficiencies of such an approach where public decision-
makers are concerned are clear: not only is the inaccuracy arguably 
systemic rather than the result of aberrance as in microeconomics,13 
but further many public decisions are made either only once or by 
single decision-makers, rendering even occasional inaccuracies 
significant.14 
Secondly, it may be possible to resolve these difficulties by 
accommodating additional individual motivations within the 
model. 15 However, such a modification not only fails to address the 
effect of public institutions, but would also appear to detract from the 
analytical rigour of the narrowly economic approach.16 The difficulty 
arises initially through the difficulty of identifying and modelling such 
motivations and of comparing them between individuals17 and 
ultimately, if the modification is extended, by the reduction of the 
model to the pointless assertion that individuals act according to their 
motivations.18 
Thirdly, the difficulties of both of the preceding approaches may be 
avoided if it is possible to apply economic self-interest while 
recognising areas of inaccuracy. These areas may be identified by the 
limits to the pursuit of self-interest in particular decision-making 
11 W Niskanen "The Reflections of a Grump" (1993) 77 Public Choice 155. 
12 J M Buchanan & G Tullock The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of 
Constitutional Democracy (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1962) 17. 
13 D L Coursey & RD Roberts "Competition in political and economic markets" (1991) 
70 Public Choice 83, 89. 
14 J S Dryzek "How Far is it from Virginia and Rochester to Frankfurt? Public Choice as 
Critical Theory" (1992) 22 Br J Pol Sci 397, 400. 
15 M E Debow & DR Lee "Understanding (and Misunderstanding) Public Choice: A 
Response to Farber and Frickey" (1988) 66 Texas 993, 996. 
16 RA Posner "The Future of Law and Economics: A Comment on Ellickson" (1989) 65 
Chi-Kent LR 57, 62. 
17 W H Riker "The Two-Party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of 
Political Science" (1982) 76 Am Pol Sci Rev 753. 
18 D Farber & P Frickey "The Jurisprudence of Public Choice" (1987) 65 Texas LR 873, 
894; A Downs An Economic Theory of Democracy (Harper & Row, New York, 1957) 276. 
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processes.19 Although this approach is deficient to the extent that it 
provides only a partial model of public decision-making, completion of 
the model is possible through the application of psychological and 
sociological decision-making. The approach would furthermore appear 
to place greater significance on the role of institutional structures than 
is possible through concentration on economic benefits without regard 
to their relation to such structures.20 
The structural analysis of each decision-making institution will 
provide first a measure of the autonomy of individual decision-
makers within institutional constraints and secondly a more 
conventional public choice assessment of the extent to which self-
interest influences the actions of decision-makers.21 Through 
combining these two descriptions it is possible to produce a model of 
decision-making which indicates the limits of self-interest and 
therefore the scope for the application of additional types of 
motivation to complete the model. 
The most promising addition to economic self-interest as a motivation 
in is the theory of expressive returns,22 which are benefits accruing to 
individuals through the symbolic or ethical benefits sought when self-
interest cannot be served by any choice.23 The greater potential for, and 
greater observed significance of, ethical and symbolic values in public 
decision-making renders the theory of such returns particularly 
applicable in the analysis of policy choice.24 
19 J M Buchanan The Economics and Ethics of Constitutional Order (University of 
Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1991), 8. 
20 J M Buchanan "Then and Now, 1961 - 1986: From Delusion to Dystopia", paper 
presented at the Institute for Humane Studies, quoted in J J Mansbridge "The Rise and 
Fall of Self-Interest in the Explanation of Political Life" in J J Mansbridge (ed) Beyond 
Self-Interest (University of Chicago, 1990), 21. 
21 TM Moe "The New Economics of Organisation" (1984) 28 Am J Pol Sci 739, 756 (in 
relation to bureaucratic structures). 
22 J A Ferejohn & M P Fiorina "The Paradox of Not Voting: A Decision-Theoretic 
Analysis" (1974) 68 Am Pol Sci R 525, 527 propose that voting is either a consumption 
benefit or an investment benefit. For a rejection of these alternatives, see R E Goodin & 
KW S Roberts "The Ethical Voter" (1975) 69 Am Pol Sci R 926. 
23 See initially, M Fiorina "The Voting Decision: Instrumental and Expressive Aspects" 
(1976) 38 J Politics 390. For a general justification of symbolic or ethical benefits, see E 
Aronson The Social Animal (2ed Clarendon, Oxford, 1976) 109 - 117. 
24 G Brennan & L Lomasky Democracy and Decision: The Pure Theory of Electoral 
Preference (CUP, Cambridge, 1993), 97. 
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D Proposal 
The paper seeks to develop a form of public choice analysis 
supplemented by both institutional analysis which allows the 
assessment of the respective roles of self-interest and expressive 
motives. By way of experiment the paper it is then proposed to analyse 
limited elements of the process of development of Treaty policy. The 
paper will proceed by addressing each institution involved in the 
formulation of government policy and determining its capacity to exert 
policy influence on the basis of its formal powers and institutional 
characteristics. The limits imposed by external factors will then be 
addressed to determine the actual authority of the institution. The 
paper then considers the role of self-interested and expressive 
motivations in the exercise of such authority before seeking to apply 
the model thus developed to aspects of the involvement of each 
institution in the formulation of government policy in relation to the 
Treaty of Waitangi. 
II PARLIAMENT 
A Introduction 
In order to analyse decision-making within the structure of 
Parliament, it is necessary to recognise three concentric groupings 
within the legislature which have different levels of authority: the 
executive, the government caucus and the legislature. 
B The Executive 
1 Economic analysis of authority 
The executive may be seen as a means by which the information and 
transaction costs of policy formulation and government supervision 
are reduced. Members of the executive are able to specialise in certain 
areas through both membership of Cabinet committees and through 
the allocation of portfolio responsibilities, and are therefore able to 
prepare policy in a coherent and confidential manner for submission 
to Cabinet and subsequently to Caucus.25 
The executive can be seen to have three principal strengths: the 
administrative control and extensive policy advice afforded ministers, 
the unity in caucus and in policy formulation in general that arises 
from collective responsibility,26 and the political power provided by 
the high profile of executive members both within the party 
organisation and in the eyes of the general public.27 
The administrative role of the executive, exercised through the 
allocation of portfolio responsibilites to ministers, can be seen to afford 
significant non-legislative authority subject to control principally 
through administrative law remedies. It is clear that the close 
connection afforded by the use of portfolios significantly reduces the 
degree of slack between the formulation and implemenation of 
25 B Galvin "Some Reflections on the Operation of the Executive" in H Gold New 
Zealand Politics in Perspective (led) (Longman, Auckland, 1985) 66, 69. 
26 Secretary to the Cabinet Cabinet Office Manual (Cabinet Office, Wellington, 1991) 
§ 3A5; J B Ringer An Introduction to New Zealand Government (Hazard, Christchurch, 
1991) 63. 
27 C Bean & A Mughan "Leadership Effects in Parliamentary Elections in Australia 
and Britain" (1989) 83 Am Pol Sci Rev 1175, 1190. 
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policy .28 Furthermore, the advice and information provided to 
members of the executive by bureaucratic agencies can be seen to 
facilitate policy formulation and evaluation. 
The unity of the executive may be seen to have a base pragmatic effect: 
the caucus, and thereby the legislature, are in most instances unable to 
oppose such a united group. However, the potentially greater effect of 
cabinet unity may be seen to be that policy compromises reached by 
members of the executive may be relied upon. The consequence of 
reliable policy compromise is to increase the capacity of individual 
members of the executive to pursue preferences through exchanges of 
support. Where policy preferences are excessively irreconcilable, the 
relationship within the executive is clearly strained.29 
The high profile of the members of the executive, and particularly of 
the party leader, may be seen to impose considerable constraints upon 
attempts by caucus members and others to oppose policy decisions or to 
seek to remove executive members.30 
2 Constraints on authority 
As will be seen below, the caucus possesses considerable formal power 
to direct the executive but is restricted in its use of them by both 
political and institutional considerations. It will also be made clear that 
although the actions of the executive are likely to be the primary 
consideration of most voters, such control is extremely 
unsophisticated. 
There is therefore little possibility that either of these means will be 
effective in preventing the executive from pursuing any given policy. 
Rather it would appear that the constraints are effective only in a 
much broader sense. It is clear that policies adopted by the executive 
will be of varied consequence for voters and caucus members. Given 
the limited opportunities of both groups to control the executive, it 
would appear possible to postulate a threshold of electoral and 
28 J Marshall "Administration and the Changing Constitution" in RM Alley (ed) State 
Servants and the Public in the 1980s (Victoria University Department of Political 
Studies, Wellington, 1980) 89, 91. Note, however, that the theory of vicarious 
ministerial responsibility which is seen to support the relationship between ministers 
and officials is not reflected in reality CT L Roberts Politicians, Public Servants and 
Public Enterpise: Restructuring the New Zealand Government Executive (Institute of 
Policy Studies, Wellington, 1987) 48). 
29 Roberts, above n 28, 40. 
30 R Mulgan Democracy and Power in New Zealand (2ed, Oxford, Auckland, 1989) 69. 
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legislative support which the executive must maintain through its 
policy decisions if it is to retain power.31 
The effects of such a broad constraint are however unclear. While it is 
apparent that executive members will consider the reactions of the 
electorate and the caucus, such reactions may be difficult to determine 
in advance. Furthermore, there is a clear tension between the policy 
exchanges made within the executive, which tend to promote more 
extensive policy development, and the pressures of such concerns. 
3 Self-interest 
The restrictions on pursuit of material gain by members of the 
executive are stringent and would furthermore appear likely to be 
easily and rigidly enforced.32 The principal opportunity for self-interest 
must therefore be seen to arise in the benefits of attaining and holding 
office. These benefits may be seen to align the self-interest of executive 
members with the need for caucus and electoral support. 
The extent to which caucus is able to withdraw such support is small, 
as is noted below. Furthermore, it is clear that while the prospect of 
reelection can be assumed to have considerable significance for most 
elected representatives, efforts taken to increase that prospect are likely 
to be tempered by the desire to see policy preferences implemented 
prior to the next election. Further, it is readily apparent that 
determination of election prospects presents some difficulty, 
particularly in relation to specific policies. 
In the case of the executive, the capacity to implement policy is, as has 
been noted, considerable. Executive members are for that reason more 
likely to make conservative assessments of the adverse electoral 
consequences of any given policy, and thus while self-interest does act 
as a broad constraint it is improbable that it will restrict any specific 
policy. 
31 B S Frey & L J Lau "Towards a Mathematical Model of Government Behaviour" 
(1968) 28 Zeitshcrift fur Nationalokonomie 355, 360. 
32 See broadly Secretary to the Cabinet Cabinet Office Manual (Cabinet Office, 
Wellington, 1991) § 2H. 
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4 Expressive Conduct 
The assumption of expressive conduct on the part of executive 
members may appear problematic, as it requires the condition of 
inconsequentiality to be disregarded altogether. It is clear however that 
while self-interest requires broad attention to be paid to external 
pressures, members of the executive can be seen to have some latitude 
in determining the form that such attention will take. Furthermore, it 
is clearly implausible to suggest that members of the executive seek 
their positions simply to act as a conduit for such pressures.33 It would 
appear more likely that elected officials will seek to act m an 
innovative fashion, within the broadest possible constraints.34 
It would therefore appear likely that there is at least scope for 
expressive conduct among members of the executive and further that 
such individuals are likely to have some degree of personal principle 
which might be given effect by such conduct. 
5 Application 
While the executive may be seen to have supported the expansion of 
Treaty policy, it is also clear that their willingness to allow such policy 
to interfere with other policy developments was limited, as the 
removal of the most stringent elements of the guidelines proposed for 
recognition of the Treaty in government policy35 in favour of less 
concrete forms of recognition and consideration of fiscal consequences 
may be seen to indicate.36 However, that recognition on a general basis 
33 J P Kalt & M A Zupan "The Apparent Ideological Behaviour of Legislators: Testing 
For Principal-Agent Slack in Political Institutions" (1990) 33 J L & Econ 103, 105. 
34 B Grofman "Public Choice, Civic Republicanism, and American Politics: Perspectives 
of a 'Reasonable Choice' Modeler" (1993) 71 Texas LR 1541, 1581. It is even possible, 
albeit controversial, that such innovation will typically be of a liberal nature (J L 
Sullivan, P Walsh, M Shamir, D G Barnum & J L Gibson "Why Politicians are More 
Tolerant; Selective Recruitment and Socialization Among Political Elites in Britain, 
Israel, New Zealand and the United States" (1993) 23 Br J Pol Sci 51, 53). 
35 The guidelines were as follows: a) to give recognition to the Treaty of Waitangi as if 
it were part of the domestic law of New Zealand in all aspects of administration and in 
preparation of legislation; b) to regard the treaty as always speaking and to apply it 
in circumstances as they arise in such a away that effect is given to its true intent and 
spirit; c) to consult with the Maori people on all matters affecting the application of 
the Treaty (cited Treasury "Treaty of Waitangi: Implications of Recognition" (The 
Treasury, Wellington, 1986) 3. 
36 K Hague "Recent Moves by the State" in H Yensen, K Hague, T McCreanor Honouring 
the Treaty: An Introduction for Pakeha to the Treaty of Waitangi (Penguin, Auckland, 
1989)113, 119-120. 
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prevailed at all may be seen to support the assertion of expressive 
motivation on the part of at least some members of the executive. The 
commitment was not total as the objection to the inclusion of Treaty 
provisions in some statutes indicates.37 
It is however possible to recognise very considerable responsiveness on 
the part of the executive to pressure from the courts and the Waitangi 
Tribunal. For example, the passage of the Treaty of Waitangi (State 
Enterprises) Act 1988 was in direct response to the New Zealand Maori 
Council decision, while the Maori Language Act Te Ture o te Reo 
Maori 1987 clearly resulted from the at least the same pressures as the 
Te Reo Maori Report of the Tribunal if not from the report itself. The 
most significant of these responses can be seen to be the addition of ss. 
9 and 27 of the State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986 after an urgent 
recommendation by the Waitangi Tribunal.38 
37 Contrast, for example, the replacement of a provision requiring that practical effect 
be given to the Treaty in the Environment Bill by a reference in the Long Title to the 
taking account of Treaty principles with the retention of a similar provision in the 
Conservation Bill. Kelsey (A Question of Honour? Labour and the Treaty 1984 -
1989(Allen & Unwin , Wellington, 1990), 76) does not offer an explanation for the 
distinction. It is plausible, however, the the greater commitment to Treaty recognition 
of the Conservation minister, the Hon. Russell Marshall, may have been responsible. 
38 P A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (Law Book, 
Sydney, 1993) 68. Waitangi Tribunal Interim Report to Minister of Maori Affairs on the 
State-Owned Enterprises Bill (December 1986) reproduced in Report of the Waitangi 
Tribunal on the Muriwhenua Fis/Jing Claim (Wai-22) 289. 
B The Government Caucus 
1 Economic analysis of authority 
The capacity of the government caucus to influence policy decisions is 
clearly considerable. First and most simply, the caucus possesses a 
parliamentary majority, affording it the exclusive right to legislate. 
Further, the caucus is responsible for the election of the Prime Minister 
and the Deputy Prime Minister and is therefore able to influence the 
composition of the executive. Finally, through the select committee 
process and caucus committees members of the caucus can formulate 
policy proposals, oversee the passage of legislation and supervise the 
implementation of policy by bureaucratic agencies.39 
It is however clear that the operation of caucus is, at least with regard 
to broad policy principles, dominated by the executive.40 The reasons 
for such dominance can be seen in the characteristics of the 
government caucus as an institution. The most fundamental of these 
characteristics is the dependence of the caucus upon collective action. 
In part the need for collectiveness can be attributed to the adverse 
electoral effect of apparent disunity among members of the same 
party.41 It is however clear that significant functional incentives exist 
for members to cooperate in the caucus process. First, the number of 
issues which the government must address renders individual 
participation in policy formulation dependent upon very large 
amounts of information. The caucus system provides members with a 
means of economising on such information costs and can be seen to 
allow members to specialise in particular areas as well as permitting 
them to perform their other responsibilities.42 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, most of the measures by which 
members of the caucus are able influence policy decisions require some 
degree of cooperation if they are to be effective. Such cooperation 
almost inevitably involves compromise among members, as the policy 
preferences of individual members almost certainly differ, even if only 
39 J B Ringer An Introduction to New Zealand Government (Hazard, Christchurch, 
1991) 66 - 68. 
40 K Jackson "Caucus: The Anti-Parliament System" in H Gold (ed) New Zealand 
Politics in Perspective (3ed, Longman Paul, Auckland) 231, 239. 
41 G W R Palmer Unbridled Power: An Interpretation of New Zealand 's Constitution 
and Government (2ed Oxford, Auckland, 1987) 71. 
42 See broadly Palmer, above n 41, 106 - 107. 
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in the priority that each accords particular iss~es. The making of such 
compromises is highly problematic in the absence of any structure by 
which the performance of mutual obligations can be ensured, as there 
is very limited recourse for members who exchange their support for 
policy commitments which are subsequently abandoned.43 
Within caucus the executive is the most efficient enforcement 
structure. As has been noted elsewhere, members of the executive are 
able to have some confidence, at least in the short term, that policy 
commitments made between members or groups of members will be 
enforced. While there are a number of other cooperative structures 
within caucus, notably caucus committees and informal groups of 
members,44 it is clear that both the limited unity and durability of such 
less formal groups significantly reduces the likelihood that 
compromises reached among their members will be enforced. 
It is however clear that the inefficiencies of enforcement structures do 
not preclude caucus members from developing policy. Rather such 
structures may be seen to render the exchange of support for particular 
policies more difficult. The consequence is that policies will attract 
support largely as a consequence of the benefits to its supporters 
inherent in each policy, rather than through exchange. Thus policies 
that comply with the common preferences of members are likely to 
prevail while policies of only specific effect are in most instances 
unsuccessful. 
2 Constraints 
The principal restriction upon the exercise of influence by caucus 
members is that imposed by the executive through its numerical and 
organisational superiority as a part of caucus and through its political 
standing, most notably its collective control over the career prospects of 
individual members and perhaps more significantly the greater status 
both within and outside the caucus of executive members. Caucus may 
also be seen to be subject to contraints of electoral pressure both 
collectively and on an individual basis. 
43 B R Weingast & W J Marshall "The Industrial Organisation of Congress; or, Why 
Legislatures, Like Firms, are not Organised as Markets" (1988) 96 J Pol Econ 132, 142. 
44 G WR Palmer "The New Zealand Legislative Machine" (1987) 17 VUWLR 285, 290. 
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3 Self-interest 
It is clear that the collective nature of caucus actions together with the 
inefficiency of exchange structures imposes significant restrictions on 
the capacity of caucus to act independently of the executive. It is 
however apparent that these restrictions also limit the role of self-
interest except where the common interest of all or most members of 
caucus is concerned. Instances of such commonality of interest may 
however be reasonably common as most policy is likely ot have some 
implication for the elctoral propsects of the caucus as a whole. 
4 Expressive conduct 
It would appear likely that the lesser involvement in policy 
formulation enjoyed by members of the caucus who are not also 
members of the executive renders expressive conduct less likely. 
Expressive conduct might also be seen to be constrained by the more 
limited involvement in policy formulation through the reduced 
capacity of such involvement to balance or outweigh conservative 
assessments of electoral support. 
5 Application 
The role of the government caucus in the formulation of policy would 
appear to have been limited in a a general sense,45 and the 
participation of the caucus in the decision to enact the Treaty of 
Waitangi Amendment Act would appear to have based upon very 
limited information. 46 Caucus involvement in relation to s. 9 of the 
State-Owned Enterprises Act would appear to have been limited by the 
introduction of the provision at the third reading, while participation 
in subsequent legislation appears to have been restrained by the 
executive.47 The members representing Maori electorates may 
45 W H Oliver "The Labour Caucus and Economic Policy Formation, 1981 - 1984" in B 
Easton (ed) The Making of Rogernomics (Auckland University, Auckland, 1989) 11, 29. 
46 B Jesson Fragments of Labour: The Story Behind the Labour Government (Penguin, 
Auckland, 1989) 96 - 97. 
47 See NZPD, vol 488, 3972, 5 May 1988 (W Peters) in relation to the Treaty of 
Waitangi (State Enterprises) Bill and NZPD, vol 494, 8217, 22 November 1988 (W 
Peters) in relation to the Treaty of Waitangi Amendment Bill. 
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however be seen to have been responsible for some elements of Treaty 
policy. 
D The Legislature 
1 Economic analysis of authority 
While the structure of Westminster government can in most instances 
be seen to afford the legislature only a very limited role in relation to 
policy formulation, it must be recognised that both the institution as a 
whole and its individual members possess some degree of authority 
over the actions of the executive. 
First and most directly, the legislature may be able to exercise influence 
through the dependence of the executive upon a legislative majority 
for statutory changes to policy. While the influence that such 
dependence affords can be seen to be directly effective only where the 
government majority is unreliable, the legislature may in all instances 
be seen to create some incentive for unity within the government 
caucus and to afford less senior members of that caucus some role in 
policy decisions. 
The legislature may be seen to exercise more significant influence by 
more indirect means, principally through the public criticism of 
government activity. While such criticism will in most instances have 
no formal consequence where executive policy is concerned, it is 
apparent that where public awareness can be raised the electoral cost of 
unpopular policy decisions can be increased. Legislative publicity or 
pressure can be seen to have a more substantial effect when applied to 
the decisions of bureaucratic agencies whether through the select 
committee process or by less formal means. 
2 Self-interest 
Given the very limited effective authority of the legislature, its capacity 
to serve its self-interest would appear very slight. However if self-
interest is taken to include first the capacity of members of the 
legislature to increase their chance of attaining or retaining 
government and secondly the capacity of members to advocate the 
views of particular interest groups,48 the self-interested character of 
48 W H Riker & B R Weingast "Constitutional Regulation of Legislative Choice: The 
Political Consequences of Judicial Deference to Legislators" (1988) 74 Va LR 373, 396. 
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what might otherwise be taken to be expressive conduct may become 
apparent.49 
In essence the process of debate and division in the legislature, together 
with accompanying statements outside the House may be taken to alter 
the eventual electoral cost of legislation by drawing the attention of the 
public and others to its detrimental, or when undertaken by 
government members, beneficial effect.SO However as the prospect of 
election is, as has been noted elsewhere, a very vague constraint, there 
is little incentive on the part of members of the legislature to accord 
particular importance to one Bill over another: the aim of all such 
conduct is simply to enhance the electoral chances of the members and 
parties involved.51 
Where the views of interest groups are concerned there is clearly 
greater regard for the content of legislation but once again little concern 
with seeking to do other than to criticise the relevant provisions. 
3 Application 
The involvement of the legislature in the formulation of Treaty policy 
was, as the foregoing might indicate, extremely slight. The limited role 
noted on the part of the Caucus may be_ seen if anything to have had a 
greater effect on the actions of the legislature. The participation of the 
legislature in the Treaty debate is perhaps most clearly seen in the 
comments of one opposition member that the Treaty of Waitangi 
Amendment Bill 1985 was deficient both in according Maori and the 
Treaty too little significance and in threatening some form of 
apartheid.52 
ill THE JUDICIARY 
A Economic Analysis 
Economic analysis of the role of the judiciary in policy formulation is 
complicated by the two components of conventional judicial 
49 Downs, above n 18, 120. 
SO G Skene "Parliament: Reassessing its Role" in Gold, above n 40, 247, 255 . 
51 G WR Palmer Constitution in Crisis : Reforming New Zealand's Political System 
(Mclndoe, Dunedin, 1991), 120. 
52 NZPD, vol 492, 6892 - 6893, 22 September 1988 (Hon. W Peters). 
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independence. The first of these is the independence of the judiciary 
from government influence; the second is the personal economic 
independence afforded by judicial tenure and by strong constraints 
upon other sources of income.s3 
The first of these elements can be seen to permit members of the 
judiciary potentially considerable discretion in reaching their decisions. 
The second largely prevents such discretion from being used in the 
pursuit of economic self-interest. The immediate conclusion is that 
models of decision-making based upon self-interest are broadly 
inapplicable to judicial decisions. 
Such a conclusion is strongly evident in the approach of many public 
choice theorists to the judicial role. The analyses advanced have had 
little success even in identifying the incentives of independent judges 
to perform their tasks with anything beyond a minimal degree of 
competence, let alone in favouring one policy choice over another. 
In the absence of economic motivation, public choice theorists have 
sought to analyse the role of the judiciary in relation to other bodies 
which are subject to such motivation. The first such analysis advocates 
the restriction of the judiciary to the implementation of legislation 
without any form of interpretation which might afford opportunities 
for autonomous conduct.54 Such an approach is open to a number of 
obvious objections, most notably that of impracticality. The principal 
response to such concerns is that the adoption by the judiciary would 
provide legislators with a strong incentive to produce clearly applicable 
law, particularly if the response of the courts to ambiguous or 
unworkable legislation is to refuse to apply it.55 
A second and more plausible model of the role of the judiciary 
proceeds from the analysis of the legislative process as a market in 
which policy decisions are exchanged for electoral support or other 
benefits. The capacity of the judiciary to interpret legislation providing 
for such policies can be seen to protect the original exchange from 
subsequent reinterpretation by the legislature. The legislature will 
therefore be obliged to modify the relevant policy by legislation, the 
53 GM Anderson, W F Shugart & RD Tollison "On the Incentives of Judges to Enforce 
Legislative Wealth Tranfers" (1989) 32 J L & Econ 215, 215. 
54 J Buchanan "Good Economics - Bad Law" (1974) 60 Va LR 483,490. 
55 F Easterbrook "Statutes' Domains" (1983) 50 U Chi L R 533, 547. 
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cost of which may be seen to increase the dependability of the initial 
exchange.56 
Thirdly, it is possible to suggest that the judiciary provides a means by 
which representatives can avoid the political consequences of 
unpopular actions.5 7 Such "blame-shifting" allows elected 
representatives to implement policies which they themselves wish for 
without suffering electorally.58 
B Authority 
The role of the courts in the formulation of policy is potentially 
considerable. Although it is possible to regard the institutional 
function of the judicial process as strongly similar to that of the 
bureaucracy, to the extent that both are concerned with the detailed 
development and implementation of broader policy directions, the 
resemblance is almost wholly removed by the near-absence of means 
of controlling judicial decision-making. 
Judicial independence comprises a number of formal and informal 
protections including the fundamental principle of the rule of law, 
judicial tenure,59 and conventions discouraging legislation overriding 
the effects of judicial decisions and governmental criticism.60 Together 
these safeguards comprise a broad constitutional principle isolating the 
courts from influence. 
Although it is clear that governments and other institutions are to 
some extent able to apply pressure to the judicial process,61 and that in 
extreme instances a member of the judiciary can be removed from 
office, it remains that the decisions of members of the judiciary are 
largely free from external constraint. The process by which members of 
the judiciary are appointed can however be of some significance, 
56 W Landes & R Posner "The Independent Judiciary in An Interest-Group Perspective" 
(1975) 18 J L & Econ 875, 879. 
57 E M Salzberger "A Positive Analysis of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers or: 
Why Do We Have An Independent Judiciary?" (1993) 13 lnt Rev L & Econ 349, 359. 
58 M Fiorina "Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative 
Process" (1982) 38 Public Choice 33, 38. 
59 SS 23 & 24, Constitution Act 1986. 
60 Secretary to the Cabinet, Cabinet Office Manual (Cabinet Office, Wellington, 1991) 
§5H. Note that the tradition in New Zealand has not been particularly consistent in 
this regard (above n 41, 184 ). 
61 Landes & Posner (above n 56, 885) suggest that possible means may include budgetary 
harassment and threats to the jurisdiction of the courts. 
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although without any means of subsequent ~nforcement.62 Through 
the use of broad statutory interpretation, members of the judiciary can 
exercise significant influence over the development of policy. 
It is true that the discretion of most members of the judiciary is subject 
to appeal or in some instances to review, but the absence of external 
accountability may be seen to remain unless it is suggested that the 
appeal process affords additional opportunities for external pressure to 
be applied. It would furthermore appear that members of higher courts 
are less open to such pressure where it is for example exerted through 
increased caseloads or reduced chances of promotion.63 
There are however a number of practical and procedural constraints 
upon the role of the judiciary in policy formulation. First, the courts 
are to some extent dependent upon the cooperation of other 
institutions for the execution of their decisions, although such 
cooperation is unlikely to be publicly withheld. Secondly, judicial 
decisions can be made only on the application of litigants, thereby 
preventing any self-referred decision-making. Thirdly, the capacity of 
adversarial proceedings to give rise to complex solutions is clearly 
limited. Fourthly, and perhaps most significantly, the application must 
disclose a valid cause of action. While any finding of validity is clearly 
made by the court itself, it may have to be justified on the basis of 
precedent or statute if the courts are not to be seen to exceed their 
proper jurisdiction. 
It is perhaps this last constraint which may be seen to indicate the true 
limits of the judicial role. It is elementary that both the protected status 
and the practical authority of the courts is, in the absence of a mandate 
or other external support, dependent in large part on the acceptance of 
the judicial process by other decision-making institutions, principally 
the legislature and the electorate. While the withdrawal of such 
acceptance may be seen to be extremely unlikely, it is clear that concern 
over such withdrawal must restrict both individual judges and 
perhaps more effectively the judiciary as a whole. The latter may be 
seen to give rise to the use of peer pressure as a constraint on 
individual judges.64 
62 M Chen & G WR Palmer Public Law in New Zealand (Oxford, Auckland, 1993) 191. 
63 M A Cohen "The Motives of Judges: Empirical Evidence from Antitrust Sentencing" 
(1992) 12 Int Rev L & Econ 13, 27. 
64 R Ellickson "Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of 
Classical Law-and-Economics" (1989) 65 Chi-Kent LR 23, 54. 
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The exercise of influence by the courts can thus be seen to be subject to 
a number of largely formal preconditions and to an ill-defined but 
effective limitation upon judicial authority in part expressed through 
such formal requirements. 
C Self-Interest 
The role of economic self-interest in the exercise of judicial authority is 
not clear, principally as a result of the broad ethical restraints which 
accompany judicial independence. The effect of these restraints, 
notably the stringent prohibition of bribery and other improper 
influences, is to isolate members of the judiciary from any but the most 
incidental economic consequences of their decisions.65 It is possible to 
identify a limited economic element in judicial activity in the need of 
individual judges to fulfil at least the minimal requirements of their 
position in order not to be removed from office and thereby lose their 
source of income or alternatively, where applicable, through the desire 
for promotion. The effect of these pressures on the content, as opposed 
to the production, of judicial decisions would however appear 
minimal. 
D Expressive Conduct 
The potential for expressive conduct on the part of the judiciary may be 
seen to be supported by the general principal that courts follow a 
deontological approach to policy formulation.66 The approach would 
also appear to reinforce perceptions of the judiciary as neutral and 
apolitical arbiters upon which the status of the courts may be seen to 
depend. While it is possible to view the emphasis placed upon the role 
of principle in judicial decisions as pretence on the part of the courts, it 
would nonetheless appear to be a form of pretence with significant 
implications for judicial reasoning. 
65 Landes & Posner, above n 56, 885. 
66 V Held "Justification, Legal and Moral" (1975) 86 Ethics 1, 10. 
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E Application 
The involvement of the courts in the development of policy in 
relation to the Treaty of Waitangi is very much a chequered history, 
perhaps most clearly seen in the violent and unprecedented 
disagreement between the High Court, accompanied by the New 
Zealand Bar, and the Privy Council over the status of the Treaty as a 
guarantee of land rights.67 Together with a strong perception that the 
courts did not provide a fair forum for the disadvantaged,68 this 
history may be seen to have deterred Maori from pursuit of Treaty 
issues through the courts.69 By the end of the decade, however, the 
actions of the Court of Appeal had come to be of enormous significance 
to the greater recognition of the Treaty.70 One commentator 
proclaimed the decisions of the courts to mark the end of colonial 
justice.71 
The most significant element of the change effected by the courts is 
clearly the first New Zealand Maori Council decision.72 The decisions 
of the Court of Appeal were clearly founded in the actions of 
Parliament,73 although this fact would appear to been overlooked by 
many commentators. 74 The Court may however be seen to have 
sought to overcome these constraints through the application of 
fiduciary principle to Treaty issues,75 to the extent of suggesting that 
statutory restraint of actions under the Treaty might be ineffective in 
67 Wallis v. Solicitor-General for New Zealand [1903] AC 173 (PC) and, for the 
reaction of the Court and the Bar see Protest of Bench and Bar (1840-1930) NZPCC App 
p. 730. 
58 See Te Whainga i Te Tika - In Search of Justice (Justice Department, Wellington, 
1986) 3. 
69 Note the opposition among Maori to the inclusion of the Treaty in the Bill of Rights 
based upon a general desire to avoid judicial participation; see for example New 
Zealand Maori Council Submission MA 185/10, lnterimReport of the Justice and Law 
Reform Select Committee on A Bill of Rights for New Zealand (1987) AJHR I.BA 31, 
and E T J Durie "The Waitangi Tribunal: Its Relationship with the Judicial System" 
[1986] NZLJ 235,237. 
70R Mulgan "Can the Treaty of Waitangi Provide A Constitional Basis for New 
Zealand's Political Future?" (1989) 41 Pol Sci 51, 57. 
71 R Walker Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou: Struggle Without End (Penguin, Auckland, 
1990) 288. 
72 New Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 641. 
73 See for example NZMC above n 72, 688 per Cooke P. 
74 RP Boast "New Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney-General : The Case of the 
Century?" [1987] NZLJ 240. 
75 P A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (Law Book, 
Sydney, 1993) 72. 
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preventing a claim for equitable reasons. 76 Justiciable Treaty rights 
independent of statutory enactment have also been advanced on 
constitutional grounds77 and on the basis of the significance of the 
Treaty to New Zealand society.78 It is clear, however, that recognition 
of the Treaty in the absence of statutory provision is open to debate 
within the Court.79 
The Court has also indicated, by prompting negotiation among the 
parties, that its capacity, whether for functional or political reasons, to 
impose a settlement was extremely limited.BO While much critical 
comment has been directed at the assertion that judicial acceptance was 
required for any settlement,81 it must be noted that the statement was 
accompanied by the view that decision by the courts was to be 
avoided.82 Such reluctance on the part of the Court may be taken to 
indicate functional rather than constitutional limits. The Court has 
however noted the need to recognise political reality in its decisions on 
at least one occasion. 83 
The approach of the court would appear to support the assumption of 
expressive motivations. From the first New Zealand Maori Council 
decision onwards, the Court of Appeal placed considerable importance 
on the profound quality of Treaty obligations and the gravity of the 
duty of both the Court and the parties,84 to the extent that it became the 
subject of allegations of extremism.85 Further, the application of broad 
legal principle to Treaty issues may be seen as the invocation by the 
76 Te Runanga o Wharekauri Rekohu v. Attorney-General [1993] 2 NZLR 301, 309. 
77 Above n 76. Contrast, however, the view of the Court in the the 1987 decision above n 
72,655. 
78 Huakina Development Trust v. Waikato Valley Authority [1987] 2 NZLR 188, 210 
~er Chilwell J; Ika Whenua v. Attorney-General [1994] 2 NZLR 20,27 per Cooke P. 
9 New Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney-General [1992] 2 NZLR 576, 603 per McKay 
J. Palmer (above n 51, 73 n 13) suggests that the more restrictive approach markes "a 
retreat from the outer limits of Treaty jurisprudence." 
BO RB Cooke "Fairness" (1989) 19 VUWLR 421,425. 
81 G WR Palmer, Address to the Wellington District Law Society, 14 December 1989; D 
Lange (1989) 163 Council Brief 1. 
82 Tainui Maori Trust Board v. Attorney-General (1989] 2 NZLR 513, 529: "In the end 
onlt the Courts can rule on whether a particular solution accords with Treaty 
principles. But in this kind of issue judicial resolution should be very much a last 
resort." 
83 Ngai Tahu v. Attorney-General (1990] 2 NZLR 500, 510. 
84 See, for example, New Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney-General (1987] 1 NZLR 
641, 663 per Cooke P.: "what matters is the spirit." 
85 P J Downey "Absolutes, Politics and Dangerous Courts" (1990] NZLR 185, 186. 
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Court of the authority afforded by its constitutional position, as may be 
the reference by the Court and by commentators to international law.86 
86 See New Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 641, 682 
(reference to good faith in the UN Charter). 
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IV THE BUREAUCRACY 
A Economic Analysis 
Bureaucratic agencies may be seen to assist in the process of policy 
formulation through both the provision of advice to elected officials 
and the detailed development and implementation of broad policy 
decisions. It may be seen that both of the bureaucratic functions noted 
above can be subjected to controls through contestability where advice 
is concerned and through auditing and other administrative controls 
in the implementation of policy.87 It is however clear that the 
effectiveness of such methods of supervision is limited in a number of 
ways. 
First, the size and organisational complexity of bureaucratic agencies 
may be seen to render both internal and external monitoring extremely 
difficult. 88 Such monitoring is also hampered by the considerable 
expertise possessed by the members of such agencies in relation to 
their responsibilities, and further by both the competence and the 
motivation of any monitoring body. For these reasons any monitoring 
is likely both to be partially ineffective and to impose additional costs, 
and it is therefore clear that agencies and their members possess some 
degree of autonomy in the exercise of their responsibilities. 
Agency autonomy may also be seen to arise in a more limited fashion 
where agencies or officials are subjected to conflicting pressures which 
afford some choice in the course of action to be followed. 89 It is 
furthermore clear that some degree of discretion is necessary to the 
performance of most bureaucratic agencies in order to overcome the 
difficulties imposed on the administrative process by imperfect 
information.90 
Bureaucratic agencies are therefore able in many instances to exert 
influence over policy formulation. Conventional public choice 
analyses of bureaucratic use of such influence has concluded that 
87 P Dunleavy Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice: Economic Explanations in 
Political Science (Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1991). 
88 W Niskanen Bureaucracy and Representative Government (Aldine, Chicago, 1971) 
192. 
89 R Rose "Giving Direction to Permanent Officials: Signals from the Electorate, the 
Market, Laws and Expertise" in J-E Lane Bureaucracy and Public Choice (Sage, London, 
1989) 210, 211-213. 
90 DC North "The New Institutional Economics" (1986) 142 J Inst & Theo Econ 230,233. 
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agency members will, both on an individual basis and collectively, in 
order to maximise their economic interest seek increases in their 
budgets and areas of authority.91 The accuracy of such analyses is yet to 
receive adequate empirical support,92 and they would appear to be 
significantly flawed in so far as they apply to individuals. 
First, the ability of individual officials to influence policy is likely to be 
to some extent reflective of the authority that each possesses. While 
there is some degree of correlation between the level of such authority 
and the potential for economic benefit, the nature of bureaucratic 
agencies places clear limits on the availability of such benefits.93 It is 
also apparent that the exclusivity of such benefits is extremely limited 
and thus that their public good nature and the likelihood of their 
underproduction is very considerable.94 In essence it may be seen that 
the individuals most capable of bringing about increases are likely to 
derive only minimal benefit.95 
Secondly, while the monitoring of bureaucratic performance may be 
difficult, control of the pursuit of direct gain, particularly in a non-
commercial environment, is likely to be considerably more effective 
and less costly.96 It would furthermore appear that the difficulties 
inherent in monitoring may be overstated by public choice analyses.97 
Two reasons may be advanced for such overestimation. The first is the 
concentration of public choice analyses upon the use of the legislature 
as a means of control, presumably in response to the significant 
monitoring role of Senate and Congressional Committees in the 
United States.98 It is true that the role of select committees in 
Westminster democracies can be seen to be similar to some extent. It 
must however be noted administrative monitoring also takes place 
through both Cabinet Ministers, judicial review and specialised 
91 WA Niskanen "Bureaucrats and Politicians" (1975) 18 J L & Econ 617, 619 . 
92 J A C Conybeare "Bureaucracy, Monooly and Competition: A Critical Analyis of the 
Budget-Maximising Theory of Bureaucracy" (1984) 28 Arn J Pol Sci 479, 486. 
93 H Stretton & L Orchard Public goods, Public Enterprise, Public ChoiceL Theoretical 
Foundations of the Contemporary Attack on Government (Macmillan/St Martins, 
London, 1994) 161. 
94 P Samuelson "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure" (1954) Rev Econ & Stat 387, 
388. 
95 Dunleavy, above n 87, 178. 
96 Dunleavy, above n 87, 200-201. 
97 Stretton & Orhcard, above n 93, 135. 
98 See, for example, M P Fiorina & R G Noll "Voters, Bureaucrats and Legislators : A 
Rational Choice Perspective on the Growth of Bureaucracy" (1978) 9 J Pub Econ 239, 253; 
Niskanen above n 91, 627. 
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administrative agencies. 99 The force of ordinary administrative 
doctrine, enforced by these means, in controlling bureaucratic 
discretion must not be overlooked.1°0 
The second cause of such overestimation, and a possible reason for the 
disregard of distinctions between Westminster and American 
administrative structures would appear to be the assumption that 
instances of bureaucratic inefficiency are entirely the result of deficient 
monitoring when it would appear that the presence of conflicting 
demands and the failure of decision-makers to provide for imperfect 
information is at least in part responsible.101 
However, while it is clear that there is little scope for the pursuit of 
economic self-interest by individual officials, it would appear likely 
that the members of bureaucratic agencies have a strong incentive to 
pursue self-interest on a collective basis. This would appear to be 
particularly true if the allocation of resources and responsibilities 
within government as a whole is seen to be a competitive process in 
which the resources afforded both the agency as a whole and its 
members can be increased or red uced.102 
B Self-Interest 
The consequences of self-interest in this context may be unclear. If 
however it is assumed that the individuals or institutions responsible 
for resource allocation are themselves motivated by self-interest it 
would seem clear that bureaucratic agencies concerned with policy 
implementation will attempt to be seen to benefit that self-interest, 
possibly in part by contrasting the deficiencies of other government 
99 B G Peters "The European Bureaucrat: The Applicability of 'Bureaucracy and 
Representative Government' to Non-Amercian Settings" (Conference Paper, "The 
Budget Maximising Bureaucrat" University of Montreal, 13 - 15 April 1989) 30. Note 
also that the majority of public choice theorists would furthermore appear to overlook 
the role of the Freedom of Information Act and the Administrative Procedure Act in 
controlling agency conduct. While it is clear that the effect of such measures is not 
constant, the deterrent posed by the possibility of their use must be of some consequence. 
100 Patrick McAuslan suggests that the concepts of relevant and irrelevant 
considerations broadly preclude self-interest as a motive in the exercise of delegated 
authority ("Public Law and Public Choice" (1988) 51 MLR 681, 688. 
lOl D Houghton "Fundamental UK-US Differences" in W A Niskanen Bureaucracy: 
Seroant or Master? (Institute of Economic Affairs, London, 1973) 67. 
102 G Galeotti "The Organisation of Comeptition in Congressional and Parliamentary 
Governments" in A Breton, G Galeotti, P Salmon, R Wintrobe (eds) The Competitive 
State: Villa Colombella Papers on Comparative Politics (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1991) 13, 
17. 
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agencies. The overall effect would appear to be at least the apparent 
alignment of the activities of bureaucratic agencies with the interests of 
those responsible for their control. It is however apparent that the 
ability of agencies either to appeal to such interests or to appear to do so 
may create distortions in resource allocation. However, bureaucratic 
agencies may also seek to avoid adverse effects of policy change by 
producing advice in opposition to proposed change.1°3 
It would therefore appear that the influence of self-interest on the 
conduct of bureaucratic agencies is potentially great, and that the role 
for expressive and deliberative motivations is correspondingly limited. 
It is however clear that the effect of economic self-interest can provide 
a remedy for the difficulties inherent in economic control, albeit 
subject to the imperfect nature of information relating to the conduct 
of the agency in question. 
C Expressive Conduct 
It may thus be seen that the potential for self-interest to act as a motive 
for members of bureaucratic agencies is relatively limited, and that 
within the area of discretionary authority of such agencies it is of very 
little relevance. Conversely, the scope for expressive motivations may 
be seen to be indicated by the existence of ethical and professional 
standards for the activities of officials which would appear to differ 
from forms of regulation intended to prevent misconduct.104 It is 
furthermore arguable that officials engaged in the provision of policy 
advice are almost certain to be influenced by some personal principle 
or ideology, even if purely as a consequence of their involvement in 
larger social processes.105 
103 Galeotti, above n 102, 25. 
104 S Kelman '"Public Choice' and Public Spirit" (1987) 87 Pub lnt 80, 94. 
105 B Hindness "Rational Choice Theory and the Analysis of Political Action" (1984) 
13 Econ & Soc 255, 276; J Hoogerwerf "De Markt als Metafoor van de Politiek: Een 





The economic analysis of bureaucratic agencies clearly has particular 
relevance for analysis of New Zealand governmental structures, given 
the importance of public choice analysis to the state sector reforms 
undertaken by the Labour government.106 In the context of these 
reforms, the capacity of bureaucratic agencies to influence policy 
decisions was extremely varied. 
In part it is possible to perceive a considerable distrust of departmental 
advice, and further a conviction that the advisory role of departments 
was to some extent deprived of its significance by the need for rapid 
change. It is further arguable that the greater transparency of 
government agencies arising from the reform process limited the 
capacity to which government agencies could appeal to the interests of 
politicians.1°7 
n the other hand the need for assistance in implementing the changes 
sought clearly produced a demand for highly flexible advice. Such 
advice may be seen to have been provided through the most 
competent agencies, most notably or notoriously the Treasury, and 
through the use of external consultants. 
2 Treaty policy 
It is difficult to discern a broad approach on the part of bureaucratic 
agencies to the formulation of Treaty policy. It would however appear 
that most departments were slow in recognising the implications of 
Treaty developments. 108 The role of Treasury would appear to be 
somewhat different in this respect. While it may be seen to have 
regarded Treaty claims and efforts to overcome socio-economic 
problems among Maori as much the same issue,109 the Treasury was 
106 J Boston "The Theoretical Underpinnings of Public Sector Restructuring in New 
Zealand" in J Boston et al. (eds) Reshaping the State: New Zealand's Bureaucratic 
Revolution (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1991) 1, 2. 
lO? C James New Territory: The Transformation of New Zealand 1984-1992 (Bridget 
Williams, 1992) 204. 
108 Palmer above n 51, 82 - 83. 
l09 Treasury Government Management : Brief to the Incoming Government (The 
Treasury, Wellington, 1987) Vol I, 131. 
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nonetheless heavily involved in identifying _and therefore to some 
extent influencing the policy consequences of greater Treaty 
recognition. 110 While the role of the Treasury in this regard may be 
criticised and may further be seen to have limited the development of 
Treaty policy,111 it would appear that its action significantly increased 
the level of consideration accorded Treaty issues by government 
agencies.112 
The role of the Department of Maori Affairs would appear to have 
been relatively limited both by internal difficulties in formulating 
policy effectively11 3 and by its poor relationship with other 
government agencies. It would also appear to have responded to the 
growing importance of Treaty issues extremely slowly, establishing a 
Treaty policy unit only in 1987.114 However, the Department seems to 
have shared the Treasury concern that any policy change be 
contained.1 15 
The Justice Department would appear to have foreseen some 
consequences and sought to impress them on the government before 
legislation was passed.116 The Treaty of Waitangi Policy Unit of the 
Department may be seen to have enhanced this role, and arguably the 
role of bureaucratic agencies in the development of Treaty policy, 
through the development of the Principles for Crown Action,117 which 
may be seen to have transferred the initiative for policy development 
from the courts and the Tribunal to the executive and its advisors.118 
110 Treasury "Treaty of Waitangi: Implications of Recognition" (Treasury, Wellington, 
1986); Treasury above n 109,322. 
111 T O'Regan "The Ngai Tahu Claim" in I H Kawharu Waitangi: Maori and Pakeha 
Perspectives of the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford, Auckland, 1989) 234, 254. 
112 Kelsey, above n 37, 65. 
113 Palmer, above n 51, 84. 
114 Report of the Department of Maori Affairs and the Board of Maori Affairs and 
Maori Trust Office for the Year Ended 31 March 1988 (1988) AJHR E.13, 12. 
115 Department of Maori Affairs Report on Submission on the Treaty of Waitangi 
Amendment Bill 20 May 1985. 
116 Kelsey, above n 37, 46. 
117 Department of Justice Principles for Crown Action on the Treaty of Waitangi 
(Department of Justice, Wellington, 1989). See A Frame "A State Servant Looks at the 
Treaty" (1990) 14 NZULR 82, 86 - 88, and also The Direct Negotiation of Maori Claims 
(Department of Justice, Wellington, 1990). 
118 Palmer above n 51, 92. 
V THE ELECTORATE 
A Economic Analysis 
The use of the secret ballot in a democratic society affords voters as a 
group an unaccountable and unanswerable means of directing 
government decision-making. However, although the power of voters 
may be seen to be unlimited in this sense, the ability of individual 
voters to exercise influence over specific policy decisions is extremely 
limited. 119 
These limits may be seen to arise solely as a result of the institutional 
characteristics of the electoral process, of which the most significant are 
its scale and its simplicity. The first of these substantially reduces the 
capacity of individual voters to exercise any direct influence at all. 
While the determination of the probability that any single vote will 
influence the electoral outcome is a matter of some debate among 
statisticians, it would appear clear that individual votes are almost 
inconsequential. Furthermore, although the number of votes gained 
by particular candidates may be taken into account by representatives it 
would appear that such influence is likely to be of limited influence 
and clarity. 
Secondly, the electoral process presents individual voters with an 
extremely limited choice in contrast to the considerable complexity of 
the process of government.120 The opportunity for expression afforded 
voters is slight, as is the amount of information that governments can 
derive from electoral outcomes. 
The capacity of voters to exercise influence in relation to a specific 
policy is further limited by the restricted range of alternatives from 
which the choice can be made. First, it is clear that the number of 
candidates for election will be limited to those prepared to incur the 
costs of campaigning on the basis of either a perceived chance of 
success or other reasons. For this reason it may not be possible for a 
voter to select a candidate advocating particular policies.121 
119 J P Kalt & MA Zupan "Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics" 
(1984) 74 Arn Econ Rev 279, 298. 
120 A Breton The Economic Theory of Representative Government (Aldine, Chicago, 
1974) 50. 
121 M J Hinich & PC Ordeshook "Social Welfare and Electoral Competition" (1971) 11 
Public Choice 73, 81. 
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Secondly, the range of alternatives is further restricted by the need of 
rational voters to balance the extent to which candidates accord with 
their preferences against the likelihood of that candidate securing 
election. Furthermore, as such likelihood is dependent upon the 
actions of others, the ability of voters to make such judgments is 
constrained by their ability to discover the votes that other electors will 
cast. Where such information is limited, as it normally the case, voters 
are likely to act in a conservative fashion and thereby further reduce 
the range of viable candidates.122 
The effect of a parliamentary system of government may be seen to 
create further informational difficulties, as the capacity of voters to 
secure particular policies becomes dependent upon not only the 
electoral success of the candidate they support but also of the success of 
his or her party in attaining government. Voters may seek to resolve 
both of these issues through the presumption that a particular party or 
candidate will eventually prevail, although in doing so they 
necessarily lose the opportunity to select a candidate who will act in 
their immediate interest. 
The ability of voters to influence specific policy decisions under such 
circumstances is clearly dependent upon the degree of separation 
between the policies advocated by individual candidates. The extent of 
such separation between candidates in a single member constituency is 
in most instances limited by the desire to attract mainstream 
support.123 
B Self-Interest 
It may therefore be seen that the degree of influence available to voters 
through the electoral process is very limited. Voters are, however, free 
to base their choice upon whatever criterion they see fit, including 
their economic self-interest. 
The ability of rational voters to use such discretion in their economic 
self-interest is however limited. It is clear that in order to identify the 
policy positions most beneficial to their self-interest, and further to 
select the candidate most closely aligned with those positions, voters 
122 R B Morton "An Analysis of Legislative Inefficiency and Ideological Behaviour" 
(1991) 69 Public Choice 211, 219. 
123 D K Whynes & R A Bowles The Economic Theory of the State (Martin Robertson, 
Oxford, 1981) 63. 
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must incur some cost. Further costs will arise m discovering the 
likelihood of electoral success of that candidate, as well as those 
involved in determining the viability of the policies advocated and 
further whether the candidate is likel to act upon them. 
Given the slight degree of influence that individual voters can 
exercise, their capacity to recoup the costs associated with casting an 
informed vote through securing a beneficial outcome is very limited. 
The level of cost that voters are prepared to incur is also reduced, and 
with it their capacity to identify and vote in their self-interest. 
It is however possible that self-interest may be better served on those 
occasions where candidates are visibily divided on a single issue. 
However, even where such division does occur, the issue must be of 
sufficient significance that voters are prepared to forego consideration 
of any other interest than that which is presented by the issue in 
question. 
The extent to which self-interest can be assumed on the part of voters 
may be seen to be further reduced if the ultimate conclusion of such an 
assumption is seen to be that rational voters, in addition to seeing little 
cause to be informed, would be unwilling to incur the costs associated 
with the act of voting. Such a conclusion would appear to indicate that 
the very large proportion of people who do vote are not rational in an 
economic sense. 
If the action of voting and that of selecting a particular candidate can be 
differentiated, it is possible that the latter affords some scope for 
rational self-interested conduct. The limits to such rational conduct 
which have been noted above can however be seen to be considerable. 
C Expressive Conduct 
The limited role that self-interest can be seen to have in relation to the 
decisions of the electorate establishes at least the possibility that voters 
are motivated by expressive concerns. The significance of personal 
ethics or principle to voting decisions is indicated on an empirical 
level, and would furthermore appear to resolve the problem presented 
by the apparent irrationality of voting noted above. 
Further support for such a conclusion is provided by the form of 
political campaigning, in which voters are rarely offered detailed 
information. Rather parties and candidate propose broad ideological 
statements, including that afforded by party identification. It is true that 
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these statements can be seen to act as approximate indication of the 
interests favoured by a particular candidate, but such approximations 
would appear to function only where the electorate can be divided into 
large groups with essentially uniform interests. 
Where such division is not possible, the tone of campaigning is likely 
to be significantly less informative, although not necessarily less 
divisive. Candidates seek to associate their policies not with improving 
the status of those who would vote for them but for society as a whole. 
Appeals to national pride, moral virtue and other largely undefined 
qualities are commonplace. Where the focus of campaigning is placed 
upon party leaders or the personal qualities of candidates, the amount 
of policy information made available to the electorate is further 
reduced in favour of more emotive content. 
D Application 
1 Introduction 
The influence of the electorate over Treaty policy is very difficult to 
determine, as the informational limitations of the electoral process 
would indicate.1 24 At the 1990 election in particular there would 
appear to have been so many other issues of concern to voters, as 
indicated by the almost uniform swing across all electorates,125 that 
distinguishing Treaty policy is rendered extremely difficult.126 
It is however apparent that the more restrictive approach of the Labour 
government from 1989 onwards was at least contemporaneous with 
party polling indicating discontent. 127 On the other hand, while it is 
apparent that Treaty policy was unpopular, albeit significantly less so 
among traditional Labour voters,128 Treaty issues received little 
124 M Chen "A Lawyer's Perspective on Maori and Gender Issues in the 1990 General 
Election" in E M McLeay (ed) 1990 General Election: Perspectives on Political Change in 
New Zealand 9Victoria University Department of Politics, Wellington, 1991) 91, 103. 
125 A McRobie "The New Zealand General Election of 1990" (1991) 10 Electoral Studies 
158, 169. 
126 p Aimer "Discussion on the Issues" in McLeay, above n 124, 105, 107. 
127 Kelsey, above n 37, 238 -239. 
128 H Gold & A Watson New Zealand Values Today: The Popular Report of the 
November 1989 New Zealand Study of Values (Massey University/ Alpha, Palmerston 
North, 1990) Table 5.3: 67 % of those surveyed felt that Treaty policy should be 
reduced or removed altogether, a view shared by only 50 % of voters. The suggestion by 
the Parlaimentary Commissioner for the Environment (Environemntal Management and 
the Principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, Parliamentary Commissioner, Wellington, 
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mention in the 1990 campaigns of any of the major parties and were 
ranked 11th among voters' priorities.129 
2 Maori seats 
The reaction of voters in the Maori electorates is also difficult to 
determine. In both 1984 and 1987 the Maori electorates do not appear to 
have been under significant challenge, although it may be suggested 
that this was in part due to the Labour policy of expanding the 
jurisdiction of the Waitangi TribunaI.130 
In 1990, while Labour retained the four Maori seats, its hold on 
Northern Maori weakened further and support for the Mana 
Motuhake party increased considerably.131 Furthermore, the Maori 
vote would appear to have been significantly limited both by low 
enrolment and turnout throughout the three elections132 and by a 
concerted campaign against voting in 1990.133 
1988) that the pace of change had left the public behind would appear correct, if 
rather mild. 
129 J Vowles & P Aimer Voters' VengeanceThe 1990 Election in New Zealand and the 
Fate of the Fourth Labour Government (Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1993) 63. 
13° C James New Territory: The Transformation of New Zealand 1984-1992 (Bridget 
Williams, Wellington, 1992) 128. 
131 H Catt "Landslide by Default: The New Zealand General Election of 1990" (1991) 
44 Parl Affs 322, 333. 
132 Vowles & Aimer, above n 129, 50: Maori non-voting increased from 23.8 % in 1984 to 
30.2 % in 1987 and 41.5 % in 1990. 
133 McRobie, above n 125, 167. 
VI INTEREST GROUPS 
A Economic Analysis 
Analysis of the role of interest groups m the process of policy 
formulation presents a number of questions that do not arise in 
relation to other public institutions. Foremost among these is that of 
definition: it is difficult to determine the particular characteristics that 
indicate the existence of an interest group and further to describe the 
manner in which a typical group can be said to function. 
It is elementary that almost any policy decision will involve some 
degree of wealth transfer and as such will benefit one section of the 
community at the expense of another.134 The decision to implement 
such a transfer reflects the capacity of the different interests concerned 
to influence the responsible individual or institution.135 The difficulty 
is that to define interest groups in terms of such influence leads to a 
broad pluralist model of the political process136 rather than an 
understanding of the institutional role of such groups. 
A functional understanding of interest groups can however be attained 
through the analysis of government in terms of political 
competition.137 If the process of government is viewed as a market in 
which costs and benefits are distributed in response to the exercise of 
political pressure, incentives exist for the collective exercise of 
influence by market participants.138 Although cooperation is in most 
instances likely to require some degree of compromise between those 
involved, it is clear that the concentrated influence afforded by 
collective action will increase the degree of pressure that group 
members are able to exert and therefore the benefits received.139 
The effects of such collective action would be slight, however, but for 
the costs incurred in the exercise of political influence. These costs, 
which include both the direct costs of political activity in terms of time 
134 S Peltzman "Towards a General Theory of Regulation" (1976) 17 J L & Econ 211, 213. 
135 G Brennan & J Buchanan "Is Public Choice Immoral? The Case for the 'Nobel' Lie" 
(1988) 74 Va LR 179, 181. 
136 See generally, C Sunstein "Interest Groups in American Public Law" (1985) 60 
Stanford LR 29, 48. 
137 J R Macey "The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of Market Exchange" (1988) 74 
Cornell LR 43, 43. 
138 S Peltzman "Towards a More General Theory of Regulation?" (1976) 19 J L & Econ 
211,215. 
139 I McLean Public Choice: An Introduction (Blackwell, Oxford, 1987) 69. 
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and other resources and the information cost involved in identifying 
the effect of a given policy on one's interests, create market distortions, 
including the rational ignorance of voters noted above, where they 
outweigh the net benefit of political activity. Interest groups may be 
seen to avoid and even to take advantage of these market distortions 
by distributing the costs of activity among their members and thereby 
pursue their interests more efficiently than can individuals. 140 Such 
efficiency can extend to the use of methods of influence which would 
be unviable on an individual basis. The capacity of interest groups to 
influence policy decisionmaking is thus potentially considerable. 
The collective nature of interest groups may however restrict their 
capacity to pursue the specific interests of individual members; as has 
been noted, some degree of compromise is likely to be required. Groups 
may however reduce the need for such compromise by seeking 
members with very similar interests or by restricting their activities to 
a small number of issues. In both instances groups will reduce the 
level of resources available to them through a reduction in 
membership in the first case and through a reduction in the 
willingness of members to contribute to group activities in the second. 
Clearly the problems of compromise must be balanced against the level 
of resources required if the group is to function effectively.141 
The capacity of interest groups to influence policy decisions is 
dependent upon both their ability to collect resources and the 
effectiveness with which those resources can be applied to influence 
the decisions of others. In order for economically rational individuals 
to contribute to the resources of an interest group, the group must be 
able to pursue policies beneficial to the interests of individuals more 
effectively than can the individuals acting alone, as has been noted. 
Further, the level of contributions that individuals are willing to make 
is reflective of the level of benefit which will accrue.142 
A more serious difficulty in attracting contributions is the receipt of 
benefits by those who are not group members. Such free-rider benefits . 
will reduce the incentive of individuals to incur the costs of 
140 M Olson The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups 
(Harvard, Cambridge Mass., 1965) 165 - 167. 
141 J Buchanan "Revolutionary Motivation and Rationality" (1979) 9 Phil & Pub Affs 
59, 65. 
142 D Austen-Smith "Voluntary Pressure Groups" (1981) 48 Economica 143, 150. 
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membership and thereby threaten group yiability.143 Successful 
interest groups are therefore likely to be those possessing some means 
of ensuring participation by all beneficiaries such as the pursuit of 
benefits which are contingent upon the participation either of all those 
concerned or of specific individuals.144 
A further and related constraint on the ability of interest groups to 
influence policy is the difficulty of targeting the benefits of government 
policy in this manner.145 More broadly, policies which too obviously 
seek benefits for group members are unlikely to succeed, given both 
the possibility of popular rejection and the need on the part of most 
decision-making institutions for at least an ostensible element of 
public interest.146 Such an appearance is particularly necessary where 
interest groups seek public support.147 Both of these difficulties, and 
that of free-riding, can to some extent be overcome where the interest 
group in question arises from an existing organisation whose 
membership and public profile are less dependent upon the pursuit of 
favourable policies. Alternatively such groups may be encouraged to 
form by political parties where the party interest is aligned with that of 
a group of individuals.148 
Finally, the influence exerted by one interest group is likely under 
some circumstances to be opposed by others. While interest group 
activity is not costless, it is clear that where the policy sought by a group 
imposes a sufficient detriment on other individuals, the incentive to 
form an opposing interest group is considerable.149 However, given 
the difficulties noted in relation to the viability of interest groups it 
would appear unlikely that a balanced state of competition will 
arise.150 
143 G Becker "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence" 
(1985) 98 Q J Econ 371, 377. 
144 Buchanan, above n 141. 
145 Breton, above n 120, 142. 
146 W C Mitchell & W C Munger "Economic Models of Interest Groups: An Introductory 
Survey" (1991) 35 Am J Pol Sci 512, 536. 
147 Becker, above n 143, 393. 
148 J R Macey "The Role of the Democratic and Republican Parties as Organisers of 
Shadow Interest Groups" (1990) 89 Mich L R 1, 5. 
149 Becker, above n 143, 375. 
150 Mitchell & Munger, above n 146,523. 
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B Self-Interest 
There would appear to be little scope for motivations other than that of 
self-interest in the actions of interest groups, although it is clear that 
external pressures may require such groups to advocate policies which 
at least appear to be of broader social benefit. The role for expressive or 
deliberative motivations is therefore likely to be superficial if it exists 
at all. 
However, given the free-rider problems faced by interest groups, 
particularly at their formation, such groups will form only rarely.151 
The large number of interest groups in most democratic societies 
would appear to indicate the existence of pressure groups that are not 
motivated by economic self-interest.152 
The existence of economically unviable interest groups would appear 
to comply with the broad expressive theory outlined above. It must be 
noted further that groups that are economically unviable may 
nonetheless have a significant influence in policy formulation, with 
the effect that policy may have considerable non-economic content.153 
It is also arguable that as the motivations of the members of such 
groups are likely to be less narrowly defined the process by which 




The New Zealand political process involves large numbers of interest 
groups to the extent that one commentator proclaimed the activities of 
such groups to be a national pastime.155 While direct lobbying of 
individual representatives as a means of exerting influence is limited 
by party whipping, it is apparent that such groups do exercise influence 
151 RD Tollison "Public Choice and Legislation" (1988) 74 Va LR 310, 343. 
152 Becker, above n 143, 375. 
153 Coursey & Roberts, above n 13, 85. 
154 P Dunleavy Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice; Economic Explanations in 
Political Science (Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1991) 34. 
155 A D Robinson "The Role of Pressure Groups in New Zealand" in S Levine (ed .) 
Politics in New Zealand (Macmillan, Sydney, 1981) 289, 290 . See also B Jesson 
"Lobbying and Protest: Patterns of Political Change at the Informal Level" in Gold, 
above n 40, 365, 368. 
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by a wide variety of methods including institutional structures such as 
the select committee process and court action and less formally by 
many means. 
However, from 1984 onwards the role of interest groups may be seen to 
have changed significantly. First, the rejection of special interests may 
be seen to have been central to government economic policy, as the 
experience of some would-be lobbyists shortly after the 1984 election 
would indicate.156 Conversely however, the Labour administration 
was strongly committed to principles of open government and 
consultation. The extensive provision for participation in policy 
formulation may be seen to have favoured interest groups motivated 
by expressive rather than self-interested concerns. The expansion of the 
select committee process may also be seen to have enhanced the 
opportunity of both forms of interest group. 
2 Treaty policy 
The importance of Maori interest groups to the development of Treaty 
policy is considerable, as without their continued efforts since the 
nineteenth century, together with the pressure exerted by the 
representatives of Maori electorates, it is clear that the Treaty would 
not exist as an issue.157 It is furthermore apparent that interest groups, 
again in company with the Maori members, had for some time prior to 
1984 been promoting the place of the Treaty in political debate. It is 
implausible that such groups were, at least until recently, motivated by 
economic interest. The conclusion that such groups were motivated by 
expressive considerations would appear to be supported by their choice 
of methods, including petitions to the Queen 158 and the marches of 
1975 and 1984, and of language that placed great significance on the 
solemnity and even the sacredness of the Treaty.159 The effectiveness 
of methods associated with expressive considerations such as the 
"politics of embarrassment" in influencing Treaty policy would appear 
to be considerable.160 It would also appear that the action of the New 
156 J Vowles "Business, Unions and the State: Organising Economic Interests in New 
Zealand" in Gold, above n 40,342, 361. 
157 See generally C Orange The Treaty of Waitangi (Allen & Unwin, Wellington, 1987) 
211- 245. 
158 Orange, above n 157, 216. 
159 Orange, above n 157, 231. 
160 R Mulgan Maori, Pakeha and Democracy (Oxford, Auckland, 1989) 146 - 147. 
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Zealand Maori Council in bringing proceedings under the State-Owned 
Enterprises Act was directed to this end rather than in any expectation 
of success.161 
It is clear that the increased activity of Treaty-related interest groups 
under the Labour government was in part due to the expanded 
provision for participation noted above and more particularly to the 
institution of participatory processes specifically in relation to Treaty 
policy, of which the most notable is the expansion of the jurisdiction of 
the Waitangi Tribunal and the enactment of provisions rendering the 
Treaty justiciable.162 It is to be noted that both of these developments 
were at least in part in reaction to the prompting of interest groups and 
that they may be seen to have permitted self-interested Treaty groups 
to become viable.163 
It must however be recognised that many of those pressing for greater 
Treaty recognition, such as anti-apartheid groups and most 
significantly the churches can be seen to possess only expressive 
motivations. 164 Furthermore, while it is apparent that these groups, 
together with the Maori Council, have to some extent been surpassed 
by economically interested groups,165 there remains a significant role 
for at least apparent expressive motives.166 The significance of such 
apparent motives may also be seen to explain the limited success of 
pressure groups opposed to Treaty recognition.167 
161 I H Kawharu "Introduction" to I H Kawharu (ed) Waitangi: Maori & Pakeha 
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VII PARTY ORGANISATIONS 
A Economic Analysis 
From an economic perspective, it is possible to view parties as 
instruments by which individuals seek the implementation of policies 
which will serve their interests. Individuals incur the costs associated 
with party membership on the basis that the collective representation 
afforded them by the party organisation increases the effectiveness 
with which policies beneficial to their interests will be advocated. 
Parties achieve such increased advocacy through the provision of 
resources to candidates. They may thus be seen to be concerned both 
with securing membership and securing political influence.168 
It is possible on this basis to draw several parallels between parties and 
interest groups. Firstly, the interest of both types of decision-maker is 
served by applying sufficient pressure through membership and other 
resources to achieve their stated policies. Secondly, the ability of both to 
attract the necessary resources is reflective of the breadth or the 
intensity of support for the policies advocated. 
It is however important to note that parties differ from interest groups 
in at least two basic respects. These distinctions stem from the potential 
controls arising from the more formal relationship between parties 
and representatives and from the limitations placed on the exercise of 
such influence by the differing functions of parties and interest 
groups.169 
B Control by Party Organisations 
The relationship between parties and their representatives in 
government can vary considerably in nature. However, it is clear that 
in most party systems the connection between party and representative 
is likely to have some formal element, unlike most relationships with 
interest groups. It must also be recognised that the different function of 
parties as is outlined below may be seen to enhance such formality, as 
the relationship is likely to be of broader effect and of greater duration 
than that between a representative and an interest group. 
168 JS Coleman "Internal Processes Governing Party Positions in Elections" (1971) 35, 59. 
169 p Mair "Myths of Electoral Change and the Survival of Traditional Parties" (1993) 
24 Euro J Pol Res 121, 131. 
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Through this more formal relationship the_ party organisation is 
potentially able to exercise direct influence over representatives and 
thereby over policy decisions through the use of disciplinary processes 
to control the actions of representatives. 
The capacity of party organisations to control representatives while in 
office is however extremely limited. Firstly, electoral law accords only 
very limited significance to party organisations, focussing instead on 
individual representatives,170 and thus the measures which parties can 
employ including the extreme step of expelling a disobedient member 
from the party cannot of themselves remove the representative from 
office. It is however open to the party organisation to threaten the 
chances of reelection of the representative through the appointment of 
another candidate or the withdrawal of campaign support, albeit at the 
risk of some electoral cost.1 71 
A second but less formal limit arises from the lack of public 
recognition of party organisations as distinct from the elected 
representatives who are party members. While representatives are 
seen to have received public consent through their election to office, 
party organisations typically enjoy both lower profile and lower status, 
and attempts to influence the actions of democratically elected 
representatives by members of the party ·hierarchy who do not possess 
such a mandate may be met with public distrust.172 
Thirdly, where parties are seeking government under a parliamentary 
system, the need for party organisations to present a coherent policy 
platform, as is discussed below, creates a strong disincentive for parties 
to risk the appearance of disunity which coercive measures may 
create.173 
Parties may be more successful in influencing policy by less direct 
means, such as the selection of candidates and through the preparation 
of manifestos. A constant limit on the effectiveness of selection as a 
means of altering policy arises from the weakness of subsequent 
controls. Further, candidate selection is clearly constrained by the 
170 Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System : Towards a Better 
Democracy (1986) AJHR H.3 265. See ss 62 - 71 Electoral Act 1993 for some slight change 
in this respect. 
171 M Wilson Labour in Government 1984 - 1987 (Allen & Unwin, Wellington, 1989) 39. 
172 R Mulgan Democracy and Power in New Zealand (2ed, Oxford, Auckland, 1989) 58. 
See, for example, the comment of the Rt Hon D Lange, then Prime Minister that policy 
decisions wre made by "responsible ministers, not party activists" (Joseph, above n 75, 
451). 
173 Palmer Unbridled Power above n 41, 77. 
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demands of electoral success, although th~se pressures may be 
rendered insignificant where such success is largely assured.174 Finally, 
where the incumbent is a party member, attempts to appoint a 
different candidate may give rise to the difficulties noted above in 
attempts to influence representatives by direct means. 
The preparation of policy documents is however a potentially 
successful means of exercising influence, particularly if the party 
organisation is perceived by representatives to be better informed as to 
the demands of their electorate, or in parliamentary systems, of the 
demands of the electoral support of the party as a whole.175 Given the 
limited capacity of individual representatives to acquire such 
information, the influence exerted by the party organisation in this 
manner may be considerable. It is however clear that some element of 
such influence will be guided by at least the apparent preferences of the 
electorate rather than by the wishes of members. 
C Self-interest of Party Organisations 
The functional distinction between parties and interest groups is clear: 
while interest groups seek to persuade others to implement their 
policies, parties are concerned with doing so directly by attaining public 
office for their members. It is true that the distinction is potentially 
unclear, and it is furthermore arguable that where the link between 
parties and representatives is slight, such as in the United States, it 
need not exist at all.176 
Where, however, the party acts as a united group within the legislature 
and must either contribute to or comprise a governing majority if its 
policies are to be implemented, as is the case under the Westminster 
system, parties are likely to formulate policies in relation to most if not 
all areas of government. Furthermore, the tendency of plurality 
electoral systems to result in single-party governments produces an 
incentive for parties to seek broad electoral support, as without such 
breadth their chance of attaining office and thereby having the 
opportunity to implement their policies is reduced.177 
174 G Brennan & L Lomasky Democracy and Decision : The Pure Theory of Electoral 
Preference (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993) 122. 
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The need for breadth both in policy and electoral support increase the 
need for compromise within the party.178 Such compromise may be 
seen to produce a tension between the policies advocated by the party 
as a whole and those sought by its individual members, as the 
incentive of individuals to incur the cost of membership is clearly 
reduced as party positions move away from their own.179 
The first consequence of this distinction is that parties are likely to be 
subjected to greater competition than are interest groups both in 
attracting members, as a result of the greater potential for 
dissatisfaction and in achieving political success, given the exclusivity 
of attaining a majority.180 Such competition would tend to constrain 
the ability of party organisations to advocate the positions of current 
members rather than those of the electorate but also prevent the party 
from seeking to appeal to too broad a section of the electorate.181 
Secondly, parties are more likely to be subject to disagreement over the 
importance of long-term viability because separate policies advocated 
by the party may require different lengths of time for their 
implementation. As more lengthy policies require a greater degree or 
at least a greater durability of electorate support, parties are still further 
constrained in the setting of policies. More broadly, party members 
clearly have an interest in the continuing viaibility of the party.182 
Thirdly, the need to acquire broad support and to do so through the 
electoral process requires substantial resources and, where significant 
expenditure limits are imposed, large numbers of members. The net 
effect of this requirement may be difficult to determine, as it indicates a 
need to balance the contributions of current members against those of 
members whom more more moderate policies might attract.183 
Finally, the breadth of policy decisions and the diversity of party 
membership render the provision of economic benefits to party 
members as a distinct group very difficult, both in practical terms and 
178 Whynes & Bowles, above n 123, 63. 
179 A Ware "Activist-Leader Relations and the Structure of Political Parties: 
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181 W H Riker The Theory of Political Coalitions (Yale, New Haven, 1962) 164. 
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also in the inconsistency between such specifi~ benefits and the broad 
support base that parties must attract.184 While it is conceivable the 
latter difficulty might be overcome by political rhetoric, the willingness 
of politicians to act for such purposes would appear limited in light of 
the limited potential for reciprocal benefits.185 
Furthermore, while members may derive such benefits as members of 
broader groups benefiting from policy decisions, the greater scale of 
such decisions is likely to be dependent upon electoral support rather 
than reflective of party members' interests. A more effective means of 
conferring individual benefits is through the use of administrative 
discretion, but such conduct would not appear likely to alter policy 
decisions and so would not appear relevant here. 
D Conclusion 
It may thus be seen that while party organisations are able to exercise 
influence over the policy positions of representatives, the dependency 
of parties upon electoral success suggests that some if not all of this 
influence is employed in the pursuit of the electoral support upon 
which implementation of such policy depends. 
It is nonetheless possible that a party sufficiently assured of electoral 
success may be able to pursue policies free from such constraints. The 
extent to which such policies may be motivated by the economic 
interests of party members is however limited by the constraints 
outlined above. A further limit on such policies may arise if they are so 
unpopular as to jeopardise the electoral support of the party. 
Within these constraints the potential for expressive conduct on the 
part of party organisations is very limited but would nevertheless 
appear to be greater than the prospect of self-interested activity. The 
expressive model would also appear to be well-suited to the nature of 
political party membership. The particular direction of such expressive 
conduct would also appear likely to incline towards ethical conduct 
given the moderating effect of policy formulation processes. 
184 A Breton The Economic Theory of Representative Government (Aldine, Chicago, 
1974) 142. 
185 L A Baker "Direct Democracy and Discrimination: A Public Choice Perspective" 
(1991) 67 Chi-Kent LR 707, 742. 
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E Application 
The role of the Labour Party organisation in influencing government 
policy between 1984 and 1990 has been recognised as extremely 
limited,186 in contrast to a traditionally strong role.187 The reasons for 
such limitation would appear to provide an almost exact parallel to 
those outlined above. 
Firstly, the party was clearly unwilling to exercise direct influence over 
representatives both because of such influence was perceived to be 
ineffective and for fear of adverse popular reaction. The risk of 
ineffectiveness may be seen to have resulted both from the presence of 
united groups within the caucus188 and further from a perception on 
the part of both the party organisation and representatives that the 
caucus enjoyed substantial electoral support independent of their party 
a ff ilia tion. 189 Party concerns over the electorate reaction to direct 
measures may be attributed to a general belief that the public distrusted 
the party organisation.190 
Control through candidate selection was also significantly restricted, in 
part because of party constitutional changes which removed much of 
the influence of the central party organisation in favour of the 
members of electorate parties.191 It is also apparent that changes in the 
nature of electoral campaigning permitted individual members to 
attain substantial popularity and so to render their removal from office 
very difficult.I 92 
186 See, for example, C James New Territory: The Transformation of New Zealand 1984 
- 1992 (Bridget Williams, Wellington, 1992) 242; J Vowles & P Aimer Voters' 
Vengeance: The 1990 Election in New Zealand and the Fate of the Fourth Labour 
Government (Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1993) 11; R Dyson "The 1984-1990 
Labour Government: What Happened and Why?" in EM McLeay (ed) The 1990 General 
Election: Perspectives on Political Change in New Zealand (Occasional Paper No. 3, 
Politics Department, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, 1991) 9, 11. 
187 R Mulgan "The Changing Electoral Mandate" in M Holland & J BostonThe Fourth 
Labour Government: Politics and Policy in New Zealand (2ed) (Oxford, Auckland, 1991) 
11, 12. 
l88 See, for example, the proposal in 1987 of the Hon. R oger Douglas, Minister of 
Finance 1984-1988, that a large part of the caucus should, if opposed by the party 
organisation, simply establish a new party themselves (Massey University Winter 
Lecture, 10 July 1992, quoted James above n . 186, 257). 
189 J Vowles "Playing Garnes with Electorates: New Zealand's Political Ecology in 
1987" (1989) 41 Pol Sci 18, 33. 
190 Wilson, above n 171, 42. 
191 C James The Quiet Revolution: Turbulence and Transition in Contemporary New 
Zealand (Allen & Unwin, Wellington, 1986) 149. 
192 J Boston & W K Jackson "The New Zealand General Election of 1987" (1988) 7 
Electoral Studies 70, 74. 
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Finally, the influence of the party organisation _over policy formulation 
was extremely limited for at least three reasons. Firstly, the process by 
which manifesto positions were negotiated did not produce detailed 
policy commitments. The initial result of the this incapacity may be 
seen in the very broad terms of the 1984 Manifesto,193 and in more 
extreme form in the decision to contest the 1987 election without any 
manifesto at all.194 
The absence of formal policy positions appears to have resulted from 
pressure from representatives to minimise such commitments, which 
were perceived as restrictive and potentially electorally costly.195 The 
inability of the party organisation to resist such pressure can in part be 
attributed to the independent support for representatives that has been 
noted above, but also to the unworkability of internal party structures 
which prevented the formulation of coherent proposals.1 96 Reforms 
made in 1988 through the establishment of policy committees and 
consultative structures appear to have come too late to alter this 
position .197 
The party organisation may also be seen to have been substantially 
constrained by its continuing desire for electoral viability. As has been 
noted elsewhere, many of the caucus did not regard the risk of electoral 
defeat as a constraint, while the party organisation by its nature was 
obliged to do so.198 The continuing need of the party for campaign 
workers,199 funding and perhaps most significantly for the votes of its 
traditional supporters200 may be seen to have taken priority over any 
attempt to influence policy towards members' self-interest. 
F Treaty Policy 
Against the backdrop of disagreement between the party organisation 
and the caucus, Treaty of Waitangi policy appears to be a rare exception. 
193 Wilson, above n 171, 38. 
194 Mulgan, above n 187, 19. 
195 Wilson, above n 171, 134. 
196 Palmer, above n 51. 
197 G Debnam "Conflict and Reform in the New Zealand Labour Party, 1984 - 1992" 
(1992) 44 Pol Sci 42, 56. 
198 Wilson, above n 171, 36. 
199 D Denemark "Programmatic Intransigence and the Limits of the Modem Campaign: 
New Zealand Labour in 1990" (1994) 46 Political Science 22, 31 -32. 
200 Wilson, above n 171, 113. 
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The policy commitments implemented by the legislature were all 
included in the 1984 Manifesto.201 
These commitments appear to have arisen from the significance of the 
Maori electorates to the Labour Party both on a symbolic leveF02 and 
also through concerns that party control of the electorates was under 
threat.203 It would however appear likely that the willingness of the 
party organisation to make some provision for the Maori seats was 
limited, given the subsequent criticism of Treaty policy by traditional 
Labour supporters.204 
It is therefore possible to construe the implementation of Treaty policy 
as in part driven by the desire of the party organisation for electoral 
success and in part due to lack of foresight. The role of self-interest in 
this respect would appear to be concerned almost entirely with 
electoral success. 
201 New Zealand Labour Party 1984 Policy Document (NZLP, Wellington, 1984) 59. 
202 Wilson, above n 171, 140. 
203 B Jesson Fragments of Labour: The Story Behind the Labour Government (Penguin, 
Auckland, 1989) 96; contrast however, R Chapman "Voting in the Maori Political Sub-
System 1935 - 1984" in Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System : 
Towards a Better Democracy (1986) AJHR H.3, B83, B102. 
204 Vowles & Aimer, above n 186, 172. 
VIII THE WAITANGI TRIBUNAL: A GENERAL ANALYSIS 
While the Waitangi Tribunal may clearly be seen to have been central 
to the development of Treaty policy between 1984 and 1990, it is 
necessary to recognise that its role was extremely complex, not least 
because its existence and operation can themselves be seen to be 
elements of that policy. Furthermore, the influence of the Tribunal 
may be seen to have extended to virtually all other governmental 
institutions but the effect of this influence clearly varied 
considerably.205 
These varied effects can be seen to result from the hybrid characteristics 
of the Tribunal as an institution. First and most obviously, it is in part 
possible to analyse the Tribunal as a very specialised judicial body, 
albeit with greater flexibility and sensitivity than the court system and 
somewhat lesser constitutional status and formal authority.206 In this 
respect the the Tribunal may be seen to enjoy a form of independence 
based in part upon the nature of its duties but also upon its possession 
of only very limited binding authority. The development by the 
Tribunal of an elementary jurisprudence, together with the adherence 
of the Tribunal to court rulings,207 relating to Treaty claims indicate a 
further similarity. Finally, the preference for the negotiation of 
settlements expressed by both the Court of Appeal and the Tribunal 
would appear to indicate a common recognition of the institutional 
limitations of both bodies.208 
Secondly, the importance of the research function of the Tribunal may 
be seen to afford it some similarity with the position of policy agencies 
in the sense that its findings provide guidance to other decision-
making institutions.209 In fulfilling this advisory role the Tribunal is 
205 p A Joseph, above n 75, 62. 
206 F M Brookfield "Sovereignty: The Treaty, the Courts and the Tribunal" [1989] 
NZRLR 292, 294. 
207 Waitangi Tribunal, Report of the Waitangi Tribunal on the Orakei Claim (Wai-9) 
1987, 127. 
208 A Sharp Justice and the Maori: Maori Claims in New Zealand Political Argument 
in the 1980s (Oxford, Auckland, 1990) 124. 
209 W H Oliver Claims to the Waitangi Tribunal (Waitangi Tribunal Division, 
Department of Justice, 1991) 15. See, for example, New Zealand Maori Council v. 
Attorney-General {1987] 1 NZLR 641, 662 and the admission of Tribunal reports as 
evidence in Te Runanga o Muriwhenua v. Attorney-General [1990] 2 NZLR 641, 653. 
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obliged both to emphasise the integrity of its methodology and and to 
recognise the need for a conciliatory approach.210 
Thirdly, the Tribunal's lack of binding powers together with the clearly 
political nature of many of the issues it has sought to address may be 
seen to have led to its adoption of an advocacy role.211 It would appear 
clear that in assuming such a role the Tribunal has acquired some of 
the characteristics of an interest group, as the efforts of the Tribunal to 
win the confidence of those it seeks to represent and to influence 
public opinion indicate.212 The assumption of such a partisan role may 
also be seen to have contributed to the inadequate funding of the 
Tribunal by government.213 
Given this hybrid nature it is difficult to determine the overall 
effectiveness of the Tribunal in influencing policy decisions. 
Furthermore, it is apparent from the relative success of some Tribunal 
efforts and the failure of others that it possesses only a very conditional 
authority. 
There would appear to be some role for self-interest in the actions of 
the Tribunal, but that role would appear to be concerned principally 
with its survival as an institution rather than the receipt of benefits by 
its members. Furthermore, assertions that Tribunal members were 
acting to their own economic benefit would appear to be ill-founded 
given the size of the Tribunal budget. 
The role of expressive conduct in Tribunal decisions would by contrast 
appear to be considerable, in part as a result of the nature of the Treaty 
issues with which the Tribunal was solely concerned and in part 
because of the significance of such conduct to each of the elements of 
the role of the Tribunal. 
210 G W R Palmer "The Treaty of Waitangi - Principles for Crown Action" (1989) 19 
VUWLR 335,337. 
211 E T J Durie 'The Waitangi Tribunal: Its Relationship with the Judicial System" 
[1986] NZLJ 235, 236; S E Kenderdine "Legal Implications of Treaty Jurisprudence" 
(1989) 19 VUWLR 347, 380. 
212 See, for example, Waitangi Tribunal Report of the Waitangi Tribunal on the 
Muriwhenua Fishing Claim (Wai-22, 1988) xxi. 
213 Te Puni Kokiri Post-Election Briefing to the Minister of Maori Affairs (Te Puni 
Kokiri, Wellington, 1993) 112; E T J Durie "Background Paper" (1995) 25 VUWLR 93, 
103. 
IX CONCLUSIONS 
A Implications of MMP 
The next New Zealand general election, which must be held by 
September of 1996, will be conducted under the mixed-member 
proportional electoral system for the first time. The probable effects of 
the change are difficult to determine, particularly in an environment 
of political uncertainty.214 It would however appear likely that the 
number of parties gaining seats by election will increase and that the 
number of seats secured by the traditional major parties will be reduced 
as their respective shares of the vote are more accurately reflected 
under the proportional system. It is unlikely, although possible, that a 
single party will achieve a majority. 
It is possible to advance two broad scenarios on the basis of these 
changes. In the first, the inability of one party to achieve a majority on 
its own leads to minority government. The second scenario is based 
upon the decision of a minority party to seek a formal coalition with 
one or more other parties. 
The implications of these scenarios for the model developed in this 
paper are extensive, although perhaps less so than many advocates of 
proportional systems might wish. Under the first, it is likely that policy 
decisions implemented by legislation would have to be made in a 
more inclusive manner and once made would be significantly more 
open to repeal or modification, increasing the scope for interest group 
pressure. 21 5 It is likely however that the volume of legislation, if not 
the amount of legislative activity, would decrease. 
The capacity of the executive to act in confidence that its decisions 
would in fact be implemented would therefore be reduced, and it 
would appear likely that the greater openness of executive activities 
under minority government would lead to a similar reduction in the 
formulation of policy. The reduced role of the executive may be seen to 
have a broader consequence of increasing the significance of both 
bureaucracy and the judiciary in policy formulation, as a reduction in 
executive activity would increase both the functional demands made 
of these institutions and the ability of discretion afforded them. 
214 F G Castles "The Policy Consequences of Proportional Representation: A Sceptical 
Commentary" (1994) 46 Pol Sci 161, 162. 
215 Palmer above n 51, 197. 
52 
Under the second scenario the probable changes would appear to be 
rather more limited. While there would clearly be some electoral 
incentive for the members of a coalition to appear independent of one 
another, the incentive is balanced by the capacity of a firm coalition to 
implement policy efficiently and also, if it endures, by electorate 
objections to intragovernmental discord. It would therefore appear 
possible that principal responsibility for policy formulation would to 
some extent be shared between the caucus and the executive. It would 
however seem likely that the inclusive nature of coalition 
government would subject much policy formulation to greater 
electoral, party, and interest-group pressure. It is impossible to 
determine whether such openness would favour or ham future Treaty 
developments. 
B Critique of Model 
The paper has sought to develop a form of economic analysis of 
government decision-making which incorporates recognition of the 
limits of economic self-interest as a motive and of the institutional 
characteristics of different decision-making bodies. The method is 
intended to provide a means for the objective positive analysis of 
governmental structure while avoiding the artificiality inherent in 
much public choice analysis. The effectiveness of expressive theory in 
this respect is significant, but it is difficult to determine whether 
deliberative models of conduct, which have been addressed briefly in 
the paper, may afford a more rigorous method of analysis. 
It is clear that the method as developed incorporates elements of other 
analytical approaches and its objectivity and thus the extent to which 
its conclusions can be evaluated empirically may suffer as a 
consequence. On the other hand the identification of the areas of such 
uncertainty would appear to be preferable to the broader uncertainty of 
public choice analyses. 
It is also apparent that the method remains dependent upon some 
degree of generalisation, and although this would appear inevitable in 
relation to any form of analysis, it would appear to render the 
deductive analysis of specific policies prone to error. On the other hand 
the model of decision-making institutions which it affords would 
appear to have some considerable strength, particular in its capacity to 
incorporate these institutions into a single structure. 
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C Treaty of Waitangi Policy 1984 - 1990 
The development of Treaty policy may thus be seen to have resulted 
from the combined efforts of the Labour caucus and party, the Courts, 
the Waitangi Tribunal and a number of interest groups. It is clear that 
the status attained by the Treaty as a result of this policy is very much a 
compromise of differing interests and as such has been the subject of 
considerable criticism. It is, however, a compromise that has brought 
about very substantial change in a relatively short period. 
It is submitted that the change is the result of three main factors. First, 
the Treaty was by its nature able to appeal to expressive motivations 
and this appeal had been enhanced by legislative and interest-group 
activity in the decade before 1984. Secondly, the principal statutory 
developments in relation to the Treaty depended for their 
implementation upon institutions which were not only driven by 
such motives but were furthermore largely independent of pressure 
from interest-driven bodies. Thirdly, the institutions responsible for 
the implementation of policy possessed, within broad limits, sufficient 
authority that reversal of their actions was effectively precluded. 
It is also apparent, however, that the capacity of government 
institutions to act upon expressive grounds is limited by functional 
and political considerations. The move towards a more centralised 
approach to Treaty policy formulation marked by the Principles for 
Crown Action may be seen as an instance of such limitation. 
It remains, however, that a great deal has been achieved. The 
institutions responsible for the development of policy were clearly 
driven by different perceptions and priorities, but it is possible to see in 
them a sentiment first expressed to a unitary sovereign some one 
hundred and thirty-eight years ago:216 
"That the law be made one; That the commandments be 
made one; That the nation be made one ... And that all might 
enjoy a peaceable life." 
216 Petition of Ngai Tahu to the Queen, 23 September 1857 (H C Evison The Treaty of 
Waitangi and the Ngai Tahu Claim: A Summary (Ka Roimata Whenua Series No. 2, 
Ngai Tahu Trust Board, Christchurch, 1988)). 
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